Skip to content
Arista Seating Solutions, Inc. — Arista Seating Solutions: An Investable Company Around a Patent

Consumer Products & Manufacturing

Arista Seating Solutions: An Investable Company Around a Patent

Arista Seating Solutions, Inc.

$12.6M

Year-5 projected revenue on a single-entity model

29%

Year-5 EBITDA margin, expanding from ~12%

$25B → $250M

TAM down to a serviceable-obtainable slice

~$300K

of founder capital already invested over 7–8 years

Situation

Arista Seating has spent 7–8 years and roughly $300K of founder capital turning a genuine idea — a patented dual-density orthopedic “sandwich” seat cushion — into a shippable product basket with two issued and two pending US patents. The markets it serves are large and tailwind-driven: sedentary lifestyles, aging demographics, and remote work all push demand for posture and back-health products.

The problem was commercialization, not invention. An early direct-to-consumer test failed: without a marketing budget, a patented product was forced to compete on price against commodity imports and got buried. The company was under-capitalized with no clear route to market for a differentiated but unknown product. The engagement’s job was to present the patent as a business, not just a product.

The engagement

CMA built the business plan, five-year financial model, brand, and pitch deck — around a reframed go-to-market and a structured market case.

The pivot that became the strategy

The strategic core was a channel pivot: stop selling direct, and sell B2B private-label — supply the patented basket to established brands who bolt it on as a new line, leveraging their distribution and capital. The pitch to a partner is clean: a ready-to-launch, patented, differentiated product delivering ~28–30% EBITDA to them. On that model, the single-entity P&L scales revenue from $2.1M to $12.6M over five years while the EBITDA margin expands from ~12% to 29%.

Revenue & EBITDA, 2024–2028 $0M $5M $10M $15M 20242025202620272028 Revenue EBITDA
Exhibit 1 — Projected revenue and EBITDA, 2024–2028 (USD millions). Margin expands with scale as fixed development costs amortize across a growing private-label volume.

From “billions” to a structured opportunity

“A huge market” doesn’t fund anything. The market case was rebuilt bottom-up across four segments — medical, automotive, furniture, and travel — sizing a $25B TAM, a $2.5B serviceable market, and a $250M obtainable slice. That structure turns an abstraction into a plan an investor can test.

TAM · $25B Medical + automotive + furniture + travel SAM · $2.5B 10% serviceable SOM · $250M 10% obtainable
Exhibit 2 — The market opportunity, sized in four segments. TAM/SAM/SOM built from user populations and per-unit spend, not a top-down 'billions' headline.

The TAM itself is concentrated where the buying is largest — furniture and medical lead, with automotive and travel as expansion lanes.

TAM by segment (USD B) $0B$5B$10B$15B Furniture (home & office) $12B Medical (home & office) $6B Automotive $5B Travel $2B
Exhibit 3 — Total addressable market by segment (USD billions). Furniture and medical anchor the opportunity; automotive and travel extend it — the sequencing logic behind the go-to-market.

Why the structure mattered

The discipline was to sell the patent as a business, not a product. A differentiated cushion with no route to market is a science project; the same cushion supplied private-label to brands that own distribution is an investable company. Pairing that channel reframe with a segment-built market case and a quarterly five-year model is what let a founder present years of R&D as a defensible, staged opportunity rather than a better mousetrap.

Impact

Arista left with a funding-ready package: a B2B private-label go-to-market, a four-segment market case ($25B → $250M), and a five-year model scaling to $12.6M at a 29% EBITDA margin — all anchored on a real IP moat of two issued and two pending patents, structured for a staged angel raise toward a trade-sale exit. (Financial figures are modeled projections, not realized results.)

The pivot was the whole strategy: stop competing on price against commodity imports, and sell the patent to the brands that already own the shelf.

Engagement details are shared with client permission or presented in anonymized form. Results described are specific to the engagement and client circumstances shown and are not a guarantee of future outcomes. See our full disclaimer.

The Transformation

Before & after

Before

A patented product with a failed direct-to-consumer test.

After

A B2B private-label model that sells through partners' distribution.

Before

A market described as 'huge' with no structure.

After

A four-segment TAM/SAM/SOM — $25B down to a $250M obtainable slice.

Before

Years of R&D and no financeable plan.

After

A five-year model scaling to $12.6M at a 29% EBITDA margin.

Before

A great cushion.

After

A defensible business, staged for an angel raise.

The Work, In Sequence

How the engagement ran

  1. 1

    Reframing the go-to-market

    After a direct-to-consumer test failed against commodity imports, the model pivots to B2B private-label — supplying the patented cushion basket to established brands as a ready-to-launch line delivering ~28–30% EBITDA to the partner.

  2. 2

    Sizing four segments

    A TAM/SAM/SOM built across medical, automotive, furniture, and travel — $25B total, a $2.5B serviceable market, and a $250M obtainable slice — replacing a vague 'billions' with a structured opportunity.

  3. 3

    A five-year model on a defensible moat

    A quarterly-built five-year P&L scaling revenue to $12.6M at a 29% EBITDA margin, anchored on two issued and two pending patents and a single-source, multi-SKU product basket.

Want results like these?

Every engagement starts the same way: a 30-minute call about your situation.

or call (573) 747-5573

Search CMA